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Introduction 
 
Nigeria has from independence and onwards been a country ridden by ethnic conflict. This may 
not come as a surprise as Nigeria is a deeply divided society. The country has a population that 
outnumbers any African state and which consists of over 250 different ethnic groups who speak 
over more than 500 languages. The three largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani from the 
north, the religiously bi-communal Yoruba of the southwest and the predominantly Christian 
Igbo of the southeast. Unsurprisingly, subsequent governments have struggled with the 
accommodation of such a diverse population. In order to manage ethnic conflicts, the Nigerians 
have adopted a radical form of territorial pluralism: ethnofederalism. Nigeria started out with a 
geographic based federal system with three subnational states. Over the years, this geographic 
based federal system evolved towards a federal system largely based on ethnic groups in order to 
mitigate ethnic conflict (Ejobowah 2010: 251). In 1999, when the new democratic government 
(the fourth Republic) came into power after years of military dictatorship, the country 
experienced its last division, resulting in 36 federal states and one federal capital territory (FCT).  
Many academics have argued that the ethnofederal system of Nigeria is a relative success: 
compared to countries such as Sudan and Cameroon, Nigeria has done relatively well (Suberu 
2009). The federal system has established inter-regional integration and has ensured the survival 
of Nigeria as one political unit without a large-scale secessionist conflict (after the civil war in 
the 1960s). However, this does not tell us much about the absolute success of the Nigerian federal 
system. Compared to Sudan, almost any country would do ‘relatively well’. Moreover, 
ethnofederalism, in general, has been studied in large-N studies where only countries that have 
had large-scale secessionist conflict have been taken into the analysis. This does not tell us 
whether this kind of institutional arrangement contributes to the solution of ethnic conflict. This 
could be due to the way academics have defined success or failure in their studies (Anderson 
2014: 201). He argues that: ‘In the case of Bosnia, for example, the ethnofederal system survives, 
but it is scarcely an exemplar of efficient governance.’ Additionally, Charron (2009: 17) 
concludes his research on effective governance within an ethnofederal context with ‘While 
studies that evaluate whether or not ethno-federations are more likely to erupt in civil conflict or 
succession are important, it is also critical that we go beyond whether or not ethno-federations 
are simply stable systems in divided societies.’. Whereas Nigeria has not seen full-blown 
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secessionist strive in recent history, ethnic conflict has seen an increase in the fourth Republic 
(Salawu 2010: 345). The research question this thesis is concerned with is thus: To what extent 
have institutional arrangements within the ethnofederal context contributed to the enduring 
occurrence of ethnic violence in the fourth Republic of Nigeria? 
This thesis seeks to explain the occurrence of Nigerian ethnic conflict since the 
installment of the fourth Republic. It will focus on the institutional arrangements in the 
ethnofederal context of Nigeria and assess whether the institutional arrangements can help 
explain the occurrence of ethnic violence. This thesis does not seek to contribute to the extensive 
academic pro-con-discussion on ethnofederalism but instead will try to find the failure of 
particular institutions in an ethnofederal context that might provide an explanation for the 
occurrence of ethnic conflict. In this thesis, I will argue that the lack of fiscal autonomy for the 
regions in Nigeria has led to a lower degree of self-governance that led to ethnic conflict. 
This thesis is divided into several sections. The first parts elaborate on the literature on 
ethnofederalism, state the hypotheses, will define the various concepts and will give an overview 
of how this research has been conducted. The subsequent sections will give a historical 
background on federalism in Nigeria as well as the analysis of the hypothesis and the conclusion.  
Literature review 
Causes of ethnic conflict 
There is a vast academic literature that deals with the nature and causes of ethnic conflict. Four 
broad traditions of explanatory enquiry in the research on ethnic conflict can be defined: 
primordialism, institutionalism, political entrepreneurs/instrumentalism and competition over 
resources (Bojana Blagojevic 2009). Primordialism explains ethnic violence by asserting ancient 
hatreds among ethnic and cultural groups, but many no longer regarded primordialism as a 
sufficient explanation of ethnic conflict (Varshney 2001).  Instrumentalism is an approach that 
argues that political entrepreneurs mobilize their support around ethnic themes, even when it is 
only to mask their own political and economic interests. Competition over resources deals with 
the political mobilization of ethnicity, which could lead to competition over resources, especially 
when resources are (very) scarce. The fourth approach is institutionalism.  Institutionalists argue 
that state institutions play an important role in mitigating or exacerbating ethnic conflict. Ethnic 
groups might be present in a society, but whether institutions respond to the ethnic make-up of 
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society determines whether ethnic divisions might lead to ethnic conflict. As with the 
primordialist approach, the institutional approach is widely debated. Some argue that organizing 
a state along ethnic lines might harden ethnic divisions, ultimately leading to conflict. This thesis 
will examine ethnic conflict through institutionalist eyes, as the purpose of the paper is to explore 
whether institutions in an ethnofederal context can contribute to ethnic conflict. 
Institutional arrangements in accommodating ethnic conflict: ethnofederalism 
Ethnofederalism is a form of institutional arrangement where a state is divided into several 
regions/states that follow ethnic divisions within a country. In order to be qualified as an 
ethnofederal state, the political system must have the following characteristics (Charron 2009: 
10): 
1. sub-units that are defined territorially and identified with an ethnic and/or linguistic 
minority;  
2.  dual sovereignty, where policy-making is divided between a center and its sub-units and;  
3. a center-sub-unit relationship that is marked by coordination and autonomy  
 
The purpose of organizing a state in such a way is that it should give the ethnic groups or 
‘nations’ within a state a degree of self-governance as states in the political system and it should 
allow regional political communities do deal with their differences in a non-violent manner. 
There is a longstanding academic debate on the effects of such a political system. The violent 
secession of regions in many ethnofederal states such as the USSR, Yugoslavia and Pakistan, 
have been used as examples by opponents of ethnofederalism whereas the relative successful 
examples of Canada and Switzerland have been widely praised by proponents. In the next part 
follows a brief discussion of this debate. 
Proponents of ethnofederalism provide extensive empirical evidence which points to the 
success of ethnofederalism. Bermeo (2002: 97-98) has argued that in Canada, Spain, Belgium 
and Switzerland, ethnofederalism has kept the country unified and democratic and that federal 
institutions promote successful accommodation of ethnic groups. Saideman et al. (2002) have 
argued that in a democratic context, ethnofederalism might contribute to ethnic protest, but 
detracts from ethnic violence. Hechter (2000) has made a similar argument. Nevertheless, why 
should such a political arrangement detract from conflict? Many scholars see ethnofederalism as 
a compromise between the central government and regional groups seeking some form of self-
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determination. Self-governance should detract from conflict (Hechter 2000: 316). This is because 
groups see both their physical survival as the survival of their identity protected (Deiwiks 2010: 
3). When a group is able to assert control over issues such as language, education, religion or 
ideology, their identity is protected and when groups are able to install their own judiciary system 
or law enforcement can protect their physical survival (Deiwiks 2009: 3).  Summarizing, in a 
system where groups enjoy self-governance, the political rights for these groups are protected. 
Moreover, these arrangements can provide a solution to conflict among ethnic groups because it 
might reduce the fear amongst minorities that their grievances will be either ignored or increased 
by losing out from governing at the national state level (Lake and Rothchild 1996: 61). As such, 
these groups should be less likely to rebel against the central government. At the same time, the 
unity of the state as a whole remains intact (Bermeo 2002; Lijphart 1977).  
 Opponents of ethnofederalism however, have found evidence that point to the failure of 
ethnofederal systems. Many academics regard the fall of the USSR and the breakup of 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as examples of the failure of ethnofederalism (Snyder 2000; 
Brubaker 1996; Roeder 1991). Mozaffar and Scarritt (1999) have argued that territorial autonomy 
has not been a viable solution for managing ethnic conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. They use the 
example of the ethnofederal variant of Ethiopia that has had the highest score of any African 
country on ethnopolitical rebellion. Again, why has ethnofederalism failed in these instances? 
Many authors have argued that self-governance amongst ethnic groups might harden ethnic lines 
between these groups. By drawing tight linkages among territory, group identity and political 
power, ethnofederalism can ‘freeze’ group identities (Bunce 2004: 180).  This can have several 
consequences: the prevention of cooperation between the ethnic groups because of the absence of 
a common identity could push minorities to pursue secessionist aspirations (even minorities that 
were not even mobilized as a politically active group). This especially happens when competition 
over scarce resources exist (de Zwart 2005; Haddad 2011). Separatist elites in an ethnofederal 
context are provided with institutional resources that enable them to pursue secession and to 
mobilize their support around ethnic themes (Hale 2008; Snyder 2000). Moreover, some have 
argued that ethnofederal states are especially sensitive for secessionism because secessionism by 
definition needs a reference to a particular territory. In an ethnofederal state, this desire is already 
fulfilled by the administrative region to which the secessionists belong (Sambanis, Milanovic 
2005).  Another main reason for failure of ethnofederalism  is that attempts or cries for self-
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determination of ethnic minorities within a country will always meet opposition from the central 
government: ‘against a right of self-determination, the authorities raise the right and duty to 
preserve union, to stamp out rebellion, to insure domestic tranquility, and to defend the state’s 
political and territorial sovereignty (Connor 1973:12) . This means that according to Connor, 
federalism is contradictory in nature: ethnofederalism is often proposed as a way to accommodate 
several territorially based differences, while at the same time, the goal is to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the existing state. 
 However, as academics remain divided over the empirical successes of ethnofederalism, it 
might be useful to turn to specific institutional arrangements within the ethnofederal context that 
could contribute to conflict. Thus, this thesis does not seek to contribute to the discussion on 
whether ethnofederalism can be conflict inducing than unitary systems, but will instead 
investigate a specific arrangement of great importance in (ethno-) federal states: fiscal policies. 
 
Self-governance, fiscal centralization and ethnic conflict 
In an ethnofederal state, the purpose is to make sure that ethnic groups enjoy a degree of 
self-governance, within one sovereign state. As is often argued in academic literature: the 
purpose of ethnofederalism is to promote unity through diversity.  Thus in an ethnofederation, 
there are two spheres of political communities: the national level and lower ones in which people 
should have the right to deal with their own local affairs, organized in ethnic entities (Ejobowah 
2000: 41-2). To accomplish that, power is delegated from the national level to the regional level. 
Self-governance, or autonomy, is especially important in an ethnofederal context as ethnic 
regions will be able to make their own decisions with regard to issues vital to the survival of the 
ethnic group such as, but not limited to: educational systems, language issues, religious issues 
and/or law enforcement systems (Tranchant 2008: 495). This not only prevents the regions from 
conflicting with each other but also that ethnic groups are protected from national policies 
regarding these issues that might threaten the very survival of the groups. Additionally, Hechter 
(2000: 143) has argued that ‘whereas some universally valued goods may better be provided 
centrally, goods that are valued only by a segment of the society are better provided locally’ as 
local governments are expected to know better what their constituencies need.  Thus, autonomy 
protects individual rights, group survival, and makes sure the ‘right mix of collective goods will 
be produced’ (Adler 1997: 1233; Hechter 2000: 143). If such a level of autonomy cannot be 
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reached, conflict is prone because then individual rights and group survival are threatened 
(Hechter 2000: 143). How should such a degree of autonomy be reached? As mentioned above, 
powers must be delegated from the national level to the regional level. Here, it is important that 
each tier of government is financially independent of each other (Adesopo et al. 2004: 182). 
Herther-Spiro (2007: 358) adopts a similar argument: independent finance of the regions is 
important to the viability of the federal structure.  In order to reach this level of financial 
autonomy for the different tiers of government, it is important that a country harbors a system of 
fiscal decentralization (Adesopo et al. 2004: 182). Fiscal decentralization means that the federal 
regions are largely responsible for collecting their own taxes, are able to control the revenues that 
they raise within their region and spend their money as they see fit. Of course, no federation has 
perfect fiscal decentralization, but regions should be able to meet these criteria to some extent. 
Federal countries must thus make important decisions with regard to which level of government 
collects what kind of taxes and how revenues are allocated (Adesopo et al. 2004: 184).  
Fiscal autonomy for the regions is jeopardized when the most important and profitable 
taxes fall under the jurisdiction of the national government and are redistributed on the national 
level, i.e. when fiscal policies are centralized. In the first case, the tax assignments cannot 
guarantee an independent and adequate revenue base for the regions and as such, fiscal autonomy 
cannot be guaranteed (Adesepo et al. 2004: 184). In the case of the latter, it is expected that 
especially wealthy regions will rebel. Wealthy regions would want revenues to be distributed in 
such a way that the allocation is based on the contributions regions make (Adesepo 2004: 186). 
Deiwiks et al. (2012: 291) have made a similar argument: when revenue is allocated on the 
national level in a federal context then conflict could be a consequence as wealthy regions in a 
country are not willing to redistribute their incomes to poorer regions. They see that as a threat to 
their fiscal autonomy. When fiscal autonomy is threatened, self-governance for the regions is 
threatened, thus leading to conflict. As Nigeria can be defined as an ethnofederal state where the 
regions are largely constituted by ethnic groups, it is expected that it will be the ethnic groups 
that rebel against fiscal centralization policies.  
Thus my hypothesis is: 
 
The centralizing of fiscal policies in Nigeria leads to less autonomy for the regions which 
contributes to ethnic conflict.in Nigeria 
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Methodology and variables 
 
This thesis is concerned with the following research question: to what extent have institutional 
arrangements within the ethnofederal context contributed to the enduring occurrence of ethnic 
violence in the fourth Republic of Nigeria?  The unit of analysis is the ethnofederal institutional 
arrangement of Nigeria. This research will conduct a qualitative research method based on an in-
depth case study. I will use process tracing to gather in-depth information on the variables. 
Process tracing is suitable for this research because as Van Evera (1997: 65) writes: ‘Evidence 
that a given stimulus caused a given response can be sought in the sequence and structure of 
events and/or in the testimony of actors explaining why they acted as they did’. So in order to 
establish how the independent variables influenced the dependent variable, a structure of events 
must be sought that, in this research, has led to ethnic conflict.  
3.1 Dependent variable: ethnic conflict 
The dependent variable this thesis is concerned with is the occurrence of ethnic conflict. 
In order to explain ethnic conflict, a definition of ‘ethnic’ is importantAs with many concepts in 
political science, ethnicity is not a clearly defined concept. Horowitz’ classic work Ethnic Groups 
in Conflict was among the first of political science research that sought a comprehensive 
definition of the concept of ethnic identity (Horowitz 1985). Horowitz’ definition of ethnicity is 
an inclusive one: “ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and 
religion; it covers ‘tribes’, ‘races’, ‘nationalities’ and ‘castes’”. Cohen (1974) applies a related 
definition: ‘An ethnic group is an informal interest group whose members are distinct from the 
members of other ethnic groups within the larger society because they share kinship, religious 
and linguistics ties’. Nagel adds to this that ethnic identities are subject to change because the 
bonds between the members of the group are imagined. It is the product of social interactions 
between members of the group and between members and non-members of the ethnic group 
(Nagel 1994).  
I will define ethnic conflict as a violent, armed conflict between members of different 
ethnic groups or ethnic groups rebelling against the national government. Of course, conflict 
doesn’t necessarily need to be violent, one could also include peaceful ethnic protest for example, 
but for the purpose and length of this thesis, I will focus on armed conflict.  What makes ethnic 
violence ethnic? Fearon and Laitin (2000: 869) provide a comprehensive answer to this question. 
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Violence is ethnic when perpetrators are motivated by a generalized hostility towards another 
ethnic group; when ethnic elites justify violence by saying it is on behalf of their ethnic group and 
when attackers are indifferent about the identity of their victims apart from their ethnicity. Thus, 
this study will assess the intensity of armed ethnic conflicts by studying ethnic armed conflict in 
both countries using process-tracing. I will rely mostly on secondary literature to assess ethnic 
armed conflict.  
Independent variable: fiscal centralization 
As stated in the hypothesis, I expect that fiscal centralization policies have led to less 
autonomy for the region that has contributed to ethnic conflict in Nigeria. I will assess fiscal 
centralization by two indicators: tax assignments and revenue allocation (Adesepo et al.  2004: 
184). I will investigate which tiers of government are responsible for what kind of tax collection. 
If the most profitable and important taxes fall under the jurisdiction of the national government, 
then fiscal policies are highly centralized. I will also turn to revenue allocation. If revenues 
allocated at the regional level flow upwards to the national level to be redistributed there, then 
fiscal policies are centralized. More importantly, if the subnational governments remain largely 
dependent on fiscal transfers from the national government for their revenues then this is an 
important indicator of fiscal centralization. 
Additionally, as Bakke and Wibbels (2006: 24) have stated; there is reason to believe that 
federal countries may experience conflict over oil resources if the oil is concentrated in certain 
regions of the country and the central government seeks to redistribute revenues generated from 
these sources. As Nigeria is an oil-rich country, I expect that this will be of vital importance. To 
assess the level of fiscal centralization with special respect to oil revenues, I will mostly use 
secondary academic sources.  
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Historical background of federalism in Nigeria 
The emergence of federalism in Nigeria 
Nigeria is one of Africa’s most populated and most ethnically diverse countries. With 
over 130 million people belonging to over 250 different ethnicities, it must come as no surprise 
that Nigerian politics have always be surrounded by ethnic issues. The roots of the current 
ethnofederal system in Nigeria can be found in its colonial history. The British established 
political control over three separate territories in 1900. The basis of the current North-South 
dichotomy was already laid in 1906 when the Lagos colony was merged with the protectorate of 
Southern Nigeria (Alapiki 2005: 52-3), where the revenue-rich South was responsible for funding 
the less endowed North protectorate. In 1946, the British created three separate regions through 
the Richard’s constitution: the Northern, the Western and the Eastern region. In all three regions, 
Regional Houses of Assembly were established. It is this point in time that many academics refer 
to as the starting point of Nigerian federalism and where the foundations for ethno-regional 
politics were established (Vande 2012: 38). It is possible that this division of regions has led to 
very strong sectional orientation in the subsequent years: whenever a region was going to lose out 
from some national political arrangement, it threatened to secede. It is important to note that in 
this time, Nigerian politics revolved around three major ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani, the 
Yoruba and the Igbo. However, as Nigeria became independent, many ethnic minorities started to 
feel marginalized and demanded the creation of more federal states to make sure their voices 
were heard. This struggle motivated the political elite to mobilize support around ethnic themes 
in order to gain power. In 1963, a fourth region was created: the Mid-Western region. However, 
this was not an attempt to accommodate minority grievances, but a way of the federal coalition 
parties to remain in power (Vande 2012: 39). Consequently, the government did not meet the 
demands of the minority ethnic groups. 
In 1967 the government was overthrown by a coup d’état and twelve new states were 
created by the new military regime. It was an effort to balance the North and the South as these 
regions had been struggling for power for years, but it could not prevent the three-year civil war 
that followed (Alapiki 2005: 56). Another motivation behind this state creation was to ‘bring the 
government nearer to the people’ and to ‘promote unity through diversity’. In 1976, General 
Mohammed exclaimed that the government should create more states in order to ensure Nigeria’s 
future political stability (Vande 2012: 58). However, this state creation exacerbated interethnic 
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and intergroup conflicts, rather than unifying the Nigerian people. In 1991, more states were 
created, but this was accompanied by various protests and violent conflicts.  
Of crucial value in the history of Nigerian federalism is that the country has been under a 
military dictatorship for almost thirty years. The military government strengthened the federal 
government at the expense of federal regions by taking control over television stations and 
newspapers (Ojo 2009: 388). Moreover, the various military regimes centralized many fiscal 
policies, serving political interests and personal enrichment (Nolte 2002: 177). The turn to 
democracy in 1999 did introduce elections on all administrative levels but did not alter the federal 
system, which thus remained highly centralized and dominated by the north. The transition to 
democracy was highly influenced by the military; the former military Head of State Obasanjo 
became president. The complete lack of popular participation in the drafting process of the 
constitution is important to note as this resulted in a widespread lack of support for the new laws. 
It was widely criticized to be supportive of the northern and military interest while ignoring the 
interests of the southern Nigerians (Nolte 2002: 178).  
Federal political system since 1999 
The constitution of 1999 divided Nigeria into 36 states and one Federal Capital Territory. 
Nigeria has three tiers of government: the federal government, the state governments and the 
local governments. Nigeria has a bicameral legislature. Both the National Assembly and the 
House of Assembly of the States have legislative powers, but when a law is produced at the state 
level that is inconsistent with national law, the national law prevails. According to Nolte (2002: 
179), many critics have argued that the division of Nigeria into 36 states has built the dominance 
of the north into the system; 17 out of 36 states are from the south. Both the Senate and the House 
of Representatives have a majority of Northern politicians. The two largest political parties are 
the All People’s Congress (currently ruling) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). In the 
next section, I will turn to the fiscal policies in the federal context of Nigeria and analyze whether 
fiscal policies have contributed to ethnic conflict in Nigeria. 
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The effect of fiscal centralization on ethnic conflict 
 
In this section, I focus on the fiscal policies of Nigeria as I expect that fiscal centralization has 
contributed to ethnic conflict in the fourth republic of Nigeria. The centralization of fiscal 
policies is expected to threaten the autonomy of the regions, whereas autonomy is an aspect of 
high importance in an ethnofederation. I expect that the regions will rebel against these 
centralizing policies. As the regions are largely constituted of an ethnic group, I expect that the 
ethnic groups are the main perpetrators of rebellion, thus contributing to ethnic conflict in Nigeria. 
Firstly, I will give a brief overview of the history of fiscal policies in Nigeria in order to 
provide for an understanding of the main trends in the fiscal policies of Nigeria. Then I will 
assess the level of fiscal centralization in the fourth Republic of Nigeria by investigating tax 
assignments and the revenue allocation system, with special regard to oil revenues. Lastly, I will 
investigate the ethnic conflict associated with these policies and establish the relationship 
between the centralization of fiscal policies and ethnic conflict in Nigeria. 
Historical overview of fiscal policies in Nigeria 
There are two important periods for the fiscal policies of Nigeria: before and after the 
discovery and exploitation of crude oil (Ukwueze 2010: 180). In the first period, the country was 
heavily dependent on agricultural revenues, while in the latter period the country was highly 
dependent on oil revenues. Before Nigeria became independent, the fiscal policies of the colony 
were highly decentralized. This means that taxes were retrieved at the national level and streamed 
back to the regions. Revenues largely returned to the states of their origin. The states relied on 
their own wealth to cover their expenditure. This contributed highly to interregional inequality as 
the wealthier states remained wealthy, and the poorer states remained poor (Offensend 1976: 
508). However, this system was subject to political manipulation as the appropriate allocation 
percentages were determined at the national level. The percentages were often skewed in favour 
of one region at the expense of the other region, depending on which region was the most 
powerful in the national government. However, in 1966 when the military overthrew the 
government and installed a military dictatorial regime, the federal government started 
centralizing this system to solidify its power. One way this was done was to alter the way the 
Distribution Pool Account (D.P.A.) was shared among the regions. Before the military coup, a 
part of the national revenue was allocated through the D.P.A., so states would receive revenue 
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based on the size of its population. The military government changed this: 50 percent would be 
distributed proportionally among the states according to the size of their population, the other 50 
percent would be divided equally among the states (Offensend 1976: 510). The aim was to solve 
the interregional inequalities that existed in Nigeria. Moreover, the new government slowly 
moved away from the derivation principle towards a more centralized policy. This is important 
because it is in this period that oil was discovered in the Niger-Delta region. Nigeria went from 
an economy largely based on revenue from agriculture to an economy based highly on oil 
revenues. The political elite failed to avoid the Dutch disease. According to Asadurian et al. 
(2006: 415) ‘From 1970 onward, the percentage of nonoil exports and manufactured goods never 
climbed above the 1988 figure of 8.8%.’ The economy remained highly based on oil revenues, 
without an incentive to develop other industries. On top, the agriculture sector was neglected 
when the oil boom began. The revenues of the oil profits under the old system would have 
returned to the states of origin, but were now federalized and redistributed among all states. The 
increase of federal fiscal power can be indicated by the fact that the states became highly 
dependent on federal revenue allocation, which is controlled by the national government. This 
has left the states to be less autonomous than in the early years of the Nigerian federation. The 
states were now dependent on the federal government for fiscal transfers, which were in turn 
highly dependent on global oil prices. A drop in global oil prices thus meant less fiscal transfers 
for the states. The centralization also led to problems of accountability, creating bad 
macroeconomic policy. Moreover, the political centre was not able to address the economic 
interests of the diverse society, creating large economic problems and mistrust (Asadurian et al. 
2006: 420). In sum, the subsequent military governments of Nigeria have centralized fiscal 
policies, creating various problems in the country.  
 
Fiscal policies during the Fourth Republic of Nigeria (1999 and onwards) 
In the previous section is established that the subsequent military governments centralized 
the fiscal policies in Nigeria. In this section, I will investigate whether fiscal policies have 
remained centralized by looking into Nigeria’s tax assignments and revenue allocation system as 
these are two important indicators of centralization. 
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Tax assignments 
In the 1999 Nigerian constitution, the various tax assignments have been established. In 
the next table, an overview of the various taxes within different levels of government’s 
jurisdictions is presented. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Tax assignments to the various levels of government 
 
 
Type of Tax Law 
Administration and 
collection Right to revenue 
1 Import duties Federal Federal 
Federation 
Account 
2 Exercise duties Federal Federal 
Federation 
Account 
3 Export duties Federal Federal 
Federation 
Account 
4 Mining rents and royalties Federal Federal 
Federation 
Account 
5 Petroleum profit tax Federal Federal 
Federation 
Account 
6 Company income tax Federal Federal 
Federation 
Account 
7 Capital gains tax Federal Federal State 
8 Personal income tax Federal Federal State 
9 Peronal income tax* Federal Federal Federal 
10 
Licensing fees on television and wireless 
radio Federal Local Local 
11 Stamp duties Federal Federal/State Local 
12 Capital transfer tax Federal State State 
13 Value added tax Federal Federal 
Federal/State/Loc
al 
14 Pool betting and other  betting taxes State State State 
15 Motor vehicle and driver’s license State State State 
16 Entertainment tax State State State 
17 Land registration and survey fees State State State 
18 Property taxes and survey fees State Local Local 
19 Market and trading license and fees State Local Local 
 *armed forces, external affairs, nonresident, residents of the FCT. and 
Nigerian police 
Source: Asadurian et al. 2006: 
423) 
 
15 
 
Of all the taxes listed in table 1, the most important taxes fall under the jurisdiction of the federal 
government. These are for example the import duties, mining taxes, and the petroleum profit tax 
and altogether account for 80% of the total national recurrent revenues (Adesopo et al. 2004: 
184-185). The taxes that are relatively harder to collect fall under the jurisdiction of the lower 
tiers of government, such as the market and trading license fees. Thus the less profitable revenues 
fall under the jurisdiction of the state and local governments. In other words, the tax assignment 
in Nigeria indicates a centralization of fiscal policies. 
 
Revenue allocation system 
The second indicator of fiscal centralization is Nigeria’s revenue allocation system. This 
is especially important since the largest share of tax revenues goes directly to the federal 
government, which then redistributes it among all tiers of government. All revenues collected by 
the national government flow into the ‘Federation Account’, monitored by the national Revenue 
Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission. This account is established by the 1999 
constitution. The redistribution of the large share of revenues collected by the federal government 
means that the lower tiers of government are dependent on national transfers for their 
expenditures (Asadurian et al. 2006: 424). Only 14% of the revenue of the federal states (second 
tier of government) and 3% of the revenue of the local governments (third tier of government) is 
internally generated revenue (Salami 2011: 31). This means that both tiers of government are 
heavily dependent on national transfers, and thus a high level of fiscal centralization is present in 
Nigeria. Unsurprisingly, what often remains a thorny issue is the formula that establishes the 
sharing rates and principles among the levels of government. In Nigeria, the allocation principle 
emphasizes the size of the population and equality of state of each region. In the next table, the 
vertical allocation of revenues in Nigeria is presented.    
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Table 2. Vertical allocation of the Federation Account since 1980 in percentages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Adesopo et al. 2004: 187 
* Shows that the 2% is not of the Federation Account but of the mineral revenue component of the 32.5 of the 
Federation Account 
** shows that the 1.5% of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account derived from the mineral producing areas 
*** 13% derivation principle partially implemented  
   
As indicated in table 2, the allocation of the Federation Account is tilted towards the 
federal government. Although in 1999 the number is significantly lower than in 1980, a trend can 
be found. The number has not changed much since the 1999 constitution, although various 
proposals have been made. In 2001 for example, the national Revenue, Mobilization, Allocation 
and Fiscal Commission proposed the following revenue allocation formula: 41.3% for the Federal 
Government, 31% for the state governments, 16% for the local governments. A new proposal in 
2008 allocated 53.69% to the Federal Government. The centralization has led to a vertical fiscal 
imbalance and a fiscal mismatch between the states’ expenditure responsibilities and their ability 
to raise revenue to meet them (Adesepo, Asaju 2004: 284). Moreover, it has not provided the 
much-needed incentive for development and growth at the state level.  Arowolo (2011: 11) for 
example argues that: ‘The revenue increment over the years has only further created an avenue 
for most of the state governors to loot their treasury’. Additionally, because states depend heavily 
on federal transfers, states have little incentive to generate revenue internally. Rather, when states 
need money for projects, they turn to the federal government thus needing approval from the 
federal government for carrying out such a project.  
 
Tier of government 1980 1984 1992 1999 
1 Federal government 53,0 55,0 50,0 48,5 
2 Regional government 30,0 32,5 25,0 24,0 
3 Local government 10,0 10,0 20,0 20,0 
4 Special funds 7,0 2,5 5,0 7,5 
 
            (i) Federal Capital Territory     N.A. / 1,0 1,0 
 
            (ii) Derivation N.A. 2,0* 1,0 *** 
 
             (iii) Development of oil mineral producing area's N.A. 1,5** 1,5 3,0 
 
             (iv) General ecology N.A. 1,0 1,0 2,0 
 
             (v) Statutory stabilization N.A. / 1,5 0,5 
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Another principle that can be derived from table 2 is the derivation principle, very 
important to Nigerian fiscal policies and national politics. The derivation principle is the 
percentage of revenues that regions pay into the Federation Account and which flows back 
directly to the region of origin without being redistributed to other regions or levels of 
government. The derivation principle only applies to revenues raised from natural resources 
(Constitution of Nigeria 1999). It has been a source of friction between the Niger-Delta states and 
the federal government for decades. Before the military came into power, the derivation 
percentage was maintained at 50% (UNDP 2006: 14). The remainder of the revenue was 
redistributed among all regions (including the producing regions) and the federal government. 
However, the military administration that came into power after the civil war put all petroleum 
resources found upon and under the land in ownership of the federal government. This meant that 
the states were denied their right to the minerals (UNDP 2006: 15). Subsequently, the derivation 
percentage decreased from 50% to a mere 1.5%. In 1993, the percentage rose to 3% as a 
palliative to a political crisis that followed the cancellation of democratic elections. The 
constitution of 1999 established that the principle of derivation should not be lower than 13% (so 
at least 13% of revenue raised by natural resources directly flows back to the state of origin). 
Although this was an improvement compared to earlier years, it has not been enough to 
compensate for the negative consequences that are associated with the oil production 
(degradation of land etc.) (Salami 2011: 44).  In the next section, I will focus on the conflict the 
centralization policies have inflicted in Nigeria. 
Conflict in the Niger-Delta 
The centralization of fiscal policies has been a source of conflict over decades in Nigeria. 
As mentioned above, the economy of Nigeria depends largely on the oil industry. There are nine 
states within the Nigerian federation that produce oil: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, 
Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers, all together commonly referred to as the Niger-Delta region. 
In 2010, petroleum and related products make up 98% of Nigerian exports. Moreover, over 80% 
of the government’s annual revenue comes from these resources. As mentioned earlier, the 
revenues from these resources flow into the Federation Account, to be redistributed among all 
states. At least 13% of these revenues must flow back directly to the states of origin, according to 
the principle of derivation established in the 1999 constitution. This was a slight improvement to 
earlier years when even less of these revenues returned directly to the oil states. This has, as also 
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mentioned above, not been enough to compensate for the negative consequences associated with 
oil production. The exploration of crude oil has led to oil spillages, uncontrolled gas flaring, 
coastal erosions etc., threatening the health of the people and the natural environment. At the 
same time, over 70% of the people in the region depend on the natural environment for 
subsistence living (Eregha, Irughe 2009: 161).  The oil-state representatives seek a 20-25% for 
the derivation principle to accommodate for their expenditures (International Crisis Group 2006), 
thus the current 13% is widely perceived as unfair. Moreover, the people living in the Niger-
Delta are amongst the poorest of the world. In 2004, the relative poverty percentage
1
 in the region 
lies around 30%. (UNDP 2006: 35). The region experiences high levels of unemployment, 
shortages of essential goods, facilities and money, poor communication and infrastructure, 
agricultural underdevelopment and health threats. The problem is that many of the citizens in this 
area feel that they could have done far better, considered they live in a resource-endowed region 
(UNDP 2006: 36). Add to this fact that they are completely dependent on national transfers and 
that oil is the only natural resource in Nigeria that has been nationalized, one can imagine that 
these policies have created feelings of alienation in the region (Ukiwo 2011: 21-22). The people 
of the Niger-Delta states feel deprived of their rightful ownership to the minerals on their land. 
Additionally, many feel that were the oil found in the areas of the major ethnic groups instead of 
the areas of the ethnic minorities of the country, the derivation principle would have looked very 
different (UNDP 2006: 15). Unsurprisingly, this has led to widespread protests in the region. 
Initially, protests against these policies have been peaceful, but the recent years have seen an 
increase in violent militancy, carried out by ethnic groups. In the next section, I will discuss the 
emergence of these violent militant groups.  
Militancy 
The militant groups in Nigeria have largely been revolved around ethnic themes, like 
Nigerians in general define themselves largely in terms of their ethnic identities rather than any 
other identity (Osaghae 2005:8). This is not surprising because ethnicity has been politicized in 
Nigeria even before Nigeria became an independent country by the colonial and post-colonial 
regimes. As Osaghae (2005: 16) argues: “Indeed, colonialism was the single most important 
factor in the crystallization of contemporary identities and identity conflicts in Nigeria.”. In this 
section, I will examine these violent ethnic militant groups. 
                                                 
1 The relative poverty measure refers to people below living two-thirds of the average weighted household income 
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As early as 1966, only a decade after oil was discovered in Nigeria, the leader of the Ijaw 
Niger Delta Volunteer Service declared the “Niger Delta Republic, distinct and separate from 
Nigeria. This group argued that they felt politically marginalized, economically deprived and 
were provoked by ethnic chauvinism (Courson 2009: 12). The uprising was overpowered by the 
government however and its leader arrested. Resistance in the region continued to grow as the 
Nigerian economy, now largely based on the oil industry, collapsed in the 1980s. This resistance 
was articulated among others by the Movement for Survival of the Ogoni People. It called for 
local autonomy for the Ogoni ethnic group and the recognition of the economic contributions of 
the Ogoni people to the Nigerian state. It protested the political marginalization of the Ogoni’s at 
the national state level. Its demands were established in the Ogoni Bill of Rights, presented to the 
Nigerian government in 1990. Its demands were rejected, although they were articulated through 
peaceful means. These protests were crushed down by the state government using military 
instruments and their leader Ken Saro-Wiwa was hanged. After the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa, 
other ethnic resistance groups emerged in the country. The federal government responded 
through the militarization of the Niger Delta. The resistance groups began to feel that non-violent 
means of pressure on the government were not helping their case and many started to take up 
arms. Examples of these groups are the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and the Niger 
Delta Freedom Fighters. This struggle forms the background of the ongoing violence in the new 
democratic republic. In the next section, I will elaborate more on the ethnic violence in the fourth 
republic. 
Ethnic violence in the fourth republic of Nigeria 
Ethnic violence seems not to have declined since 1999. In his first year as president, 
Obasanjo deployed more troops in the Niger Delta. In 1999, government forces raided an oil-
producing community in Bayelsa state where an estimated 2500 people lost their lives in order to 
protect oil installations in the territory. A state official stated that: “when we need to be hard, we 
have been very hard. We were very tough when it came to Odi town where our policemen and our 
people were killed by these ethnic militants. And the federal government went in and literally 
leveled the whole place. And the proof of the pudding is in the eating. It has never happened 
again since that time. So, I think that policy works.” (Courson 2009: 15). The government had 
acted against militias believed to be loyal to the Ijaw Youth Council that had supposedly killed 
twelve policemen in Bayelsa state. This incident was seen as the largest deployment of troops 
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since the Biafran war (Omotola 2009: 140). Another important militia group in the fourth 
republic is the Niger Delta People Volunteer Force, comprised of Ijaw young men (Human 
Rights Watch 2005: 4). Its leader Alhaji Mujahid Abubakar Asari Dokubo threatened to launch a 
war unless greater control of the oil resources was given to the Ijaw people, arguing that the Ijaw 
are an endangered community (Ukiwo 2007: 71) . In 2005, Asari was arrested leading to 
increased feelings of the Ijaw of being targeted unfairly by the national government. The 
presence of the Joint Task Force (a government military force whose mandate is to repress (non-) 
violent protests in the region) adds to these feelings. In the aftermath of this struggle, another 
important militant group emerged: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. This 
group, constituted of a coalition of various Ijaw armed groups across the region, has been profiled 
by the Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism as “an active terrorist group that uses 
violent means to support the rights of the Ethnic Ijaw people in the Niger Delta”. They object to 
the lack of benefits the community has received from its extensive oil resources (Hanson 2007: 2). 
It has attacked oil companies and abducted foreign employees of such companies in order to 
block the production of oil in the region. The government increased its troops deployed in the 
region in order to ‘neutralize the militants’, regarding the group as criminals. For example in 
2006 the government again crushed three Ijaw communities, leaving 20 persons dead. MEND has 
always stated that they want justice and fairness. The spokesperson of the organization has stated 
that: “We are asking for justice. We want our land, and the Nigerian government to transfer all 
its involvement in the oil industry to host communities which will become shareholders in these 
oil companies”. Also in 2006, MEND declared it would carry out ‘Operation Black Mamba 
Strike’ on 10 March 2006 if the government did not comply with a derivation principle of 25% 
(Ukiwo 2007). 
According to Courson (2009: 21), this statement is consistent with the demand of many 
ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta for resource control and local autonomy in the region. Other 
active groups include the Egbema National Congress (ENC), Ijaw Elders Forum (IEF). 
Movement for the Reparation of Ogbia, Movement for the Survival of Itsekiri Ethnic Nationality 
(MOSIEN), the Izon National Development and Welfare Association (INADEWA), Isoko 
Community Oil Producing Forum (ICOPF), and Movement for the Survival of Izon Nationality 
(MOSIN) (Ikelegbe 2001: 443). The rather controversial elections of 2007 put another president 
in power. He initiated the formation of the Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution 
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Committee, supported by MEND-leader Henry Okah. However, his arrest in 2007 led to the 
declaration of armed campaigns by MEND, deteriorating the peace process. The government 
expanded its military presence in the Niger Delta in the years after and clashes between 
government forces and MEND-forces still exist on a regular basis.   
 
Analysis 
How has fiscal centralization led to ethnic conflict in the case of Nigeria? The fiscal 
centralization policies have established that the federal government is responsible for most tax 
collections, the subsequent redistribution and that the redistribution is in tilted towards the federal 
government. More importantly, the federal states collect very little revenue on their own (see 
table 1) which makes them highly dependent on national transfers and provides for little 
incentives for economic development. Moreover, the redistributions the states receive are too 
little to compensate for their expenditures. In the Nigerian case, this has meant that regions 
endowed with oil cannot benefit from their resources and remain unable to bore into other 
sources of development. The oil found in the region is owned by the state and thus the revenues 
coming from this industry (also the most profitable revenues in the Nigerian tax system) are 
collected by the national government and redistributed throughout the country with a derivation 
principle of 13%. The oil extraction comes with many disadvantages for the people in the region: 
the environment suffers a lot of damage while more than 70% of the people who live in the delta 
depend solely on the natural environment for subsistence living. Moreover, the people of the 
Niger-delta region are amongst the poorest of the world (UNDP 2006: 35-7), while at the same 
time, the gross domestic product of the region is relatively high due to the oil industry. Thus the 
‘goose that lays the golden egg’ benefits little from the rich resources. This has created the 
feeling that the people are deprived of their rightful ownership of the minerals and that the people 
did not need to be this poor if they controlled the resources. 
As a result, there has been a rise of economic nationalism in the Niger-Delta region. 
Various ethnic groups including MEND, Ijaw Youth Council, and others, have protested 
peacefully and violently against these centralization policies and make claims for resource 
control and local autonomy. These groups complain of marginalization, unfair treatment and feel 
that the survival of their group is at stake. According to these groups, ‘anything short of an 
adequately applied derivation principle makes it to be an instrument of domination, oppression 
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and exploitation’ (Akinola, Adesopo 2011: 254). These claims follow the assumptions of 
ethnofederalism: each government should be able to sustain a significant level of self-governance 
to the extent that they should be free of interference from any other government. Financial 
independence is key to such a level of self-governance. The lack of fiscal autonomy and the 
ability to exploit their own resources is a threat to that freedom and thus to the self-governance of 
the inhabitants of the region, hence the conflict. Additionally, I expected that it would be most 
likely that the wealthy regions rebel against fiscal centralization as they would want revenues to 
be distributed in such a way that the allocation is based on the contributions regions make. 
Although the people of the Niger-Delta states are not wealthy at all, in terms of gross domestic 
product, this region is relatively wealthy. This conclusion thus confirms my hypothesis which 
states that ‘The centralizing of fiscal policies in Nigeria leads to less autonomy for the regions 
which contributes to ethnic conflict.in Nigeria’.  
Conclusion 
 
Nigeria has been an ethnofederal country since independence. In 1999, Nigeria experienced its 
last division, resulting in 36 federal states and one federal capital territory. Many expected a 
decline in ethnic violence, from which the country had suffered for decades, but this obviously 
was not the case. This thesis has focused on the following research question: to what extent have 
institutional arrangements within the ethnofederal context contributed to the enduring occurrence 
of ethnic violence in the fourth Republic of Nigeria? There is a extensive academic debate on the 
success of ethnofederalism with regard to containment of ethnic conflict. Some argue that 
ethnofederalism exacerbates the differences between ethnic groups and that those groups are 
handed the tools to pursue secession. Others have argued that when ethnic groups are able to 
govern themselves, ethnic conflict will decrease. However, this thesis did not seek to contribute 
to this debate but instead looked for institutional arrangements in an ethnofederal context that 
might account for the occurrence of ethnic conflict in Nigeria. As in ethnofederal countries, 
regions are ought to have a substantial degree of self-governance. I expected that regions that do 
not reach that level would experience ethnic conflict, as the survival of ethnic groups would be 
threatened in such a case. Ethnic groups cannot fully be autonomous if their regions are not 
financially independent to a substantial degree. Thus, I investigated the level of fiscal autonomy. 
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To assess the level of fiscal autonomy I have used two important indicators: tax assignments and 
revenue allocations. Tax assignments are important because it provides government with what 
revenue they can control. In a federal state, tax assignments should provide an independent 
revenue base. In Nigeria, the most important and profitable taxes are assigned to the federal 
government, providing the federal government with the largest fiscal power, while the other tiers 
of government are not able to establish an independent revenue base. The federal government 
redistributes these revenues to the other tiers of government. The largest share of the 
redistribution goes to the federal government. As such, I concluded that Nigeria experiences a 
high level of fiscal centralization. This leaves the other tiers of government highly dependent on 
national transfers. When states need money for projects, they must seek permission from the 
national government. Moreover, the fiscal centralization provides no incentives for the states to 
seek an independent revenue base and jeopardizes economic development on the state level. 
Subsequently, I have argued that the centralization policies of Nigeria have led to ethnic conflict. 
I have argued that the oil producing states of the Niger Delta region pay their revenues from the 
oil industry into the Federation Account. The national government redistributes those revenues to 
all tiers of government with a derivation principle of 13%. The derivation principle has been a 
bone of contention in Nigerian politics for decades. In Nigeria’s early years, this percentage was 
around 50%, reduced to 1.5% in the military era and is currently 13%. The citizens of the region 
regard this percentage as unfair as they feel that the national legislation deprives them of their 
rightful ownership of these minerals. In the context of land degradation due to the oil exploration, 
a high level of poverty and health threats, this has created a tense situation in the region that 
eventually boiled over in ethnic conflict.  Many ethnic militias such as the Ijaw Youth Council 
and MEND started to engage in violent conflict with the national government in order to gain 
more autonomy and power over the resources. As such, I have confirmed my hypothesis. The 
lack of fiscal autonomy and ability to exploit resources is a threat to their financial freedom and 
thus to the self-governance of the various ethnic groups of the region, hence the conflict.  
A major limitation of this research is that I have only looked into an institutional 
explanation for ethnic conflict, whereas other explanations might also work. Greed could for 
example also be a main driver of ethnic conflict, especially in in the Niger Delta. The conflict in 
the Niger-Delta will be difficult to resolve. Based on this research, I would recommend 
guaranteeing the people of the region more fiscal autonomy, starting with changing the derivation 
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principle. However, this thesis did not seek to look for a solution to the conflict, but merely an 
explanation. Further research will be needed in order for a resolution to come through. 
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